1 THOMAS P. O'BRIEN United States Attorney ROBB C. ADKINS Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Santa Ana Branch 3 JENNIFER L. WAIER Assistant United States Attorney 4 California Bar Number: 209813 NICOLA J. MRAZEK 5 Trial Attorney, Fraud Section Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice 6 411 West Fourth Street, Suite 8000 Santa Ana, California 92701 7 Telephone: (714) 338-3550 Facsimile: (714) 338-3708 8 Jennifer.Waier@usdoj.gov E-mail: 9 Attorney for Plaintiff United States of America 10 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 12 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 13 14 Case No. CR 07-69(A)-AG UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 15 Plaintiff, 16 <u>PLEA AGREEMENT FOR</u> DEFENDANT LEO WINSTON SMITH 17 v. LEO WINSTON SMITH 18 a/k/a Lee Smith, 19 Defendant. 20 21 This constitutes the plea agreement between LEO WINSTON SMITH, also 22 1. known as Lee Smith ("defendant") and the United States Attorney's Office for the Central 23 District of California (the "USAO") and the United States Department of Justice, Criminal 24 Division, Fraud Section (the "Fraud Section") (the USAO and the Fraud Section are, together, 25 referred to as the "Department of Justice") in the above-captioned case. This agreement is 26 limited to the Department of Justice and cannot bind any other federal, state or local 27 prosecuting, administrative or regulatory authorities. 28

PLEA

2. Defendant gives up the right to indictment by a grand jury and consents to the filing of a first superseding information, and agrees to plead guilty to that first superseding information. At the time of sentencing, the Department of Justice will dismiss the underlying indictment.

NATURE OF THE OFFENSE

- 3. In order for defendant to be guilty of count one, which charges a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, the following must be true: (1) there was an agreement between two or more persons to commit at least one crime, specifically 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act); (2) defendant became a member of the conspiracy knowing of its object and intending to help accomplish it; and (3) one of the members of the conspiracy performed at least one overt act for the purpose of carrying out the conspiracy.
- 4. In order for defendant to be guilty of a violation of Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2 the following must be true: (1) defendant, as a domestic concern, willfully made use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce; (2) corruptly; (3) in furtherance of an offer, payment, gift, promise to give, promise to pay or authorization of the payment of money or giving of anything of value either indirectly or directly; (4) to any foreign official, which means any officer or employee of a foreign government, or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, (5) for purposes of: (a) influencing acts and decisions of such foreign official in his official capacity; (b) inducing such foreign official to do and omit to do acts in violation of the lawful duty of such official; (c) securing an improper advantage; or (d) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign government and instrumentalities thereof to affect and influence acts and decisions of such government and instrumentalities, in order to assist defendant and others known and unknown, in obtaining and retaining business for or with, or directing business to any person.

The term "domestic concern," as defined in the FCPA, includes any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1)(A).

5. In order for defendant to be guilty of count two, which charges a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), the following must be true: (1) defendant corruptly endeavored; and (2) to obstruct and impede the due administration of the Internal Revenue laws.

<u>PENALTIES</u>

- 6. The statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose for a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371 is: five years' imprisonment; a three-year period of supervised release; a fine of \$250,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from the offense, whichever is greater; and a mandatory special assessment of \$100.
- 7. The statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose for a violation of Title 26, United States Code, Section 7212(a) is: three years' imprisonment; a three-year period of supervised release; a fine of \$5,000, whichever is greater; a mandatory special assessment of \$100; and a mandatory order of restitution to the United States.
- 8. Therefore, the total maximum sentence for all offenses to which defendant is pleading guilty is: eight years' imprisonment; a three-year period of supervised release; a fine of \$255,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from the offenses, whichever is greater; and a mandatory special assessment of \$200.
- 9. Supervised release is a period of time following imprisonment during which defendant will be subject to various restrictions and requirements. Defendant understands that if defendant violates one or more of the conditions of any supervised release imposed, defendant may be returned to prison for all or part of the term of supervised release, which could result in defendant serving a total term of imprisonment greater than the statutory maximum stated above.
- 10. Defendant also understands that, by pleading guilty, defendant may be giving up valuable government benefits and valuable civic rights, such as the right to vote, the right to possess a firearm, the right to hold office, and the right to serve on a jury.
- 11. Defendant further understands that his conviction in this case may subject defendant to various collateral consequences, including but not limited to, deportation, revocation of probation, parole, or supervised release in another case, and suspension or

revocation of a professional license. Defendant understands that unanticipated collateral consequences will not serve as grounds to withdraw defendant's guilty plea.

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FACTUAL BASIS

- Defendant and the Department of Justice agree and stipulate to the statement of 12. facts set forth below. This statement of facts includes facts sufficient to support a plea of guilty to the charges described in this agreement. It is not meant to be a complete recitation of all facts relevant to the underlying criminal conduct or all facts known to defendant that relate to that conduct.
- At all times relevant to this plea agreement, defendant, a citizen of the United 13. States, was a domestic concern. From 1998 to approximately 2003, defendant was acting as Director of Sales and Marketing at Pacific Consolidated Industries, LP ("PCI"), headquartered in Santa Ana, California. PCI was a company engaged in the manufacture of Air Separation Units ("ASUs") and Nitrogen Concentration Trolleys ("NCTs") for defense departments throughout the world. Defendant's main responsibility at PCI was to obtain business from, and negotiate contracts with, various domestic and international clients, including the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense ("UK-MOD"), Defense Logistics Organization, Royal Air Force ("RAF") Base Wyton in Cambridgeshire, England. UK-MOD, including its Defense Logistics Organization, was a department, agency, and instrumentality of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (the "United Kingdom").
- During 2000 through 2003, a citizen of the United Kingdom was a civil servant 14. and an employee of UK-MOD (the "UK-MOD Employee"). As an employee of UK-MOD, the UK-MOD Employee was a foreign official. The UK-MOD Employee was involved in the procurement of certain equipment for UK-MOD and took part in the review of requests for proposals for UK-MOD contracts, otherwise known as "tenders." As a result of his position at UK-MOD, the UK-MOD Employee was able to influence the awarding of UK-MOD contracts for services and equipment.
- Beginning in or about 1999, and continuing to an unknown date, defendant 15. conspired with the President of PCI (the "President"), to pay bribes and authorize the payment

of bribes to and for the benefit of the UK-MOD Employee in order to obtain and retain lucrative UK-MOD contracts for PCI. Defendant and the President obtained the lucrative contracts. Beginning in or about 1999, and continuing to in or about April 2002, defendant and the President caused approximately \$71,350 in payments to be made to the UK-MOD Employee in return for the award to PCI of UK-MOD Contracts. To facilitate these bribe payments, on October 21, 1999, the President executed a spurious marketing agreement between PCI and the Relative for consulting/marketing services to customers in Europe at a rate of \$5,000 for two quarters.

16. In addition, defendant corruptly endeavored to obstruct and impede the due administration of the Internal Revenue laws by, among other things, under-reporting income on his 2003 tax return and failing to file a 2003 tax return for Design Smith, Inc., a Nevada corporation.

WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

- 17. By pleading guilty, defendant gives up the following rights:
 - a) The right to persist in a plea of not guilty.
 - b) The right to a speedy and public trial by jury.
- c) The right to the assistance of legal counsel at trial, including the right to have the Court appoint counsel for defendant for the purpose of representation at trial. (In this regard, defendant understands that, despite his plea of guilty, he retains the right to be represented by counsel and, if necessary, to have the court appoint counsel if defendant cannot afford counsel at every other stage of the proceedings.)
- d) The right to be presumed innocent and to have the burden of proof placed on the government to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
 - e) The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against defendant.
- f) The right, if defendant wished, to testify on defendant's own behalf and present evidence in opposition to the charges, including the right to call witnesses and to subpoena those witnesses to testify.

1	Acceptance of	-3	[U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) & (b)]
2	Responsibility:		
3	Total Offense Level	13	
4	21. The Department of Justice maintains that an additional \$276,617 in payments		
5	made in 2003 were also bribes in violation of the FCPA. If the Department of Justice proves		
6	at the time of sentencing that these additional payments were in violation of the FCPA, the		
7	parties agree and stipulate to the following applicable sentencing guideline factors: ⁴		
8	Count One		
9	Base Offense Level:	10	[U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(a)]
10	More than \$200,000 in bribes, but less than	12	[U.S.S.G. §§ $2C1.1(b)(2)$; $2B1.1(B)(1)(G)$]
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12	Offense Level:	22	
13	Count Two		
14	Offense Level:	14	[U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2]
15	Grouping		5
16	Highest Offense Level	22	[U.S.S.G. §§ $3D1.1(a)(2)$, $3D1.2(d)$, $3D1.3(b)$] ⁵
17	Acceptance of Responsibility:	-3	[U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) & (b)]
18	<u>icesponstonicy</u> .		
19	Total Offense Level	19	
20	22. In addition, if the Department of Justice proves at the time of sentencing that		
21	these additional payments were in violation of the FCPA, the Department of Justice will argue		
22	that this constituted more than one bribe under U.S.S.G. §§ 2C1.1(b)(1) warranting a two level		
23	increase in the Count One offense level to an offense level of 24, resulting in a total offense		
24	level of 21. Defendant will be free to argue against the two level increase.		
25	⁴ If the additional payments are found to be violations of the FCPA, the parties stipulate and agree that use of the 2003 Guidelines Manual is appropriate. ⁵ Because the charged counts are grouped together pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d), the offense guideline that produces the highest offense level shall be applied. See U.S.S.G. §		
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28	3D1.3(b).		
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- 23. Except as provide above, the Department of Justice and defendant will not argue for any additional specific offense characteristics, adjustments, or departures.
- 24. Under either guideline calculation above, defendant reserves the right to argue for downward variances under <u>Booker</u> based on his age and health.
- 25. There is no agreement as to defendant's criminal history or criminal history category.
- Office or the Court. Both defendant and the Department of Justice are free to: (a) supplement the facts by supplying relevant information to the United States Probation Office and the Court, and (b) correct any and all factual misstatements relating to the calculation of the sentence.

DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATIONS

- 27. Defendant agrees that he will:
 - a) Plead guilty as set forth in this agreement.
- b) Not knowingly and willfully fail to: (i) appear as ordered for all court appearances, (ii) surrender as ordered for service of sentence, (iii) obey all conditions of any bond, and (iv) obey any other ongoing court order in this matter.
- c) Not commit any crime; however, offenses which would be excluded for sentencing purposes under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c) are not within the scope of this agreement.
- d) Not knowingly and willfully fail to be truthful at all times with Pretrial Services, the U.S. Probation Office, and the Court.
- e) Pay the applicable special assessment at or before the time of sentencing unless defendant lacks the ability to pay.
- f) Defendant hereby waives any statute of limitations defense he might now have regarding the criminal offenses charged in the first superseding information.

THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S OBLIGATIONS

28. If defendant complies fully with all defendant's obligations under this agreement, the Department of Justice agrees:

- a) To abide by all sentencing stipulations contained in this agreement.
- b) At the time of sentencing, provided that defendant demonstrates an acceptance of responsibility for the offense up to and including at the time of sentencing, to recommend a two-level reduction in the applicable sentencing guideline offense level, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and to recommend and, if necessary, move for an additional one-level reduction if available under that section.
- c) To recommend that defendant be sentenced at the low end of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range.

BREACH OF AGREEMENT

- 29. If defendant, at any time between the execution of this agreement and defendant's sentencing on a non-custodial sentence or surrender for service on a custodial sentence, knowingly violates or fails to perform any of defendant's obligations under this agreement ("a breach"), the Department of Justice may declare this agreement breached. If the Department of Justice declares this agreement breached, and the Court finds such a breach to have occurred, defendant will not be able to withdraw defendant's guilty plea, and the Department of Justice will be relieved of all of its obligations under this agreement.
- 30. Following a knowing and willful breach of this agreement by defendant, should the Department of Justice elect to pursue any charge that was either dismissed or not filed as a result of this agreement, then:
- a) Defendant agrees that any applicable statute of limitations is tolled between the date of defendant's signing of this agreement and the commencement of any such prosecution or action.
- b) Defendant gives up all defenses based on the statute of limitations, any claim of preindictment delay, or any speedy trial claim with respect to any such prosecution, except to the extent that such defenses existed as of the date of defendant's signing of this agreement.
- c) Defendant agrees that: i) any statements made by defendant, under oath, at the guilty plea hearing; ii) the stipulated factual basis statement in this agreement; and

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iii) any evidence derived from such statements, are admissible against defendant in any future prosecution of defendant, and defendant shall assert no claim under the United States Constitution, any statute, Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or any other federal rule, that the statements or any evidence derived from any statements should be suppressed or are inadmissible.

LIMITED MUTUAL WAIVER OF APPEAL AND COLLATERAL ATTACK

- Defendant gives up the right to appeal any sentence imposed by the Court, and 31. the manner in which the sentence is determined, provided that: (a) the sentence is within the statutory maximum specified above and is constitutional; (b) the Court in determining the applicable guideline range does not depart upward in offense level or criminal history category and determines that the total offense level is 21 or below; and (c) the Court imposes a sentence within or below the range corresponding to the determined total offense level and criminal history category. Defendant also gives up any right to bring a post-conviction collateral attack on the conviction or sentence, except a post-conviction collateral attack based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a claim of newly discovered evidence, or a retroactive change in the applicable Sentencing Guidelines, sentencing statutes, or statutes of conviction. Notwithstanding the foregoing, defendant retains the ability to appeal the conditions of supervised release imposed by the court, with the exception of the following: standard conditions set forth in district court General Orders 318 and 01-05; the drug testing conditions mandated by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(a)(5) and 3583(d); and the alcohol and drug use conditions authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(7).
- 32. The Department of Justice gives up its right to appeal the sentence, provided that: (a) the Court in determining the applicable guideline range does not depart downward in offense level or criminal history category; (b) the Court determines that the total offense level is 21 or above; and (c) the Court imposes a sentence within or above the range corresponding to the determined total offense level and criminal history category.

COURT NOT A PARTY

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The Court is not a party to this agreement and need not accept any of the 33. Department of Justice's sentencing recommendations or the parties' stipulations. Even if the Court ignores any sentencing recommendation, finds facts or reaches conclusions different from any stipulation, and/or imposes any sentence up to the maximum established by statute, defendant cannot, for that reason, withdraw defendant's guilty plea, and defendant will remain bound to fulfill all defendant's obligations under this agreement. No one - not the prosecutor, defendant's attorney, or the Court - can make a binding prediction or promise regarding the sentence defendant will receive, except that it will be within the statutory maximum.

NO ADDITIONAL AGREEMENTS

Except as set forth herein, there are no promises, understandings or agreements 34. between the Department of Justice and defendant or defendant's counsel. Nor may any additional agreement, understanding or condition be entered into unless in a writing signed by all parties or on the record in court.

PLEA AGREEMENT PART OF THE GUILTY PLEA HEARING

The parties agree and stipulate that this Agreement will be considered part of the 35. record of defendant's guilty plea hearing as if the entire Agreement had been read into the record of the proceeding.

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EFFECTIVE DATE 1 This Agreement is effective upon signature by defendant, his attorney, an 36. 2 Assistant United States Attorney with the USAO, and a Trial Attorney with the Fraud Section. 3 Defendant understands that this Agreement is contingent upon the approval of the Tax 4 Division of the United States Department of Justice, and that an Assistant United States 5 Attorney or Trial Attorney may not sign it unless and until such approval is granted. 6 AGREED AND ACCEPTED 7 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 THOMAS P. O'BRIEN 10 United States Attorney 11 12 Augst 28, 2009 13 sistant United States Attorney 14 15 FRAUD SECTION, CRIMINAL DIVISION 16 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE STEVEN A. TYRRELL, Chief 17 MARK F. MENDELSOHN, Deputy Chief 18 19 20 A J. MRAZEK, Trial Attorney Fraud Section, Criminal Division 21 U.S. Department of Justice 22 23 III24 /// 25 111 26 III27 III28 ///

I have read this agreement and carefully discussed every part of it with my attorney. I understand the terms of this agreement, and I voluntarily agree to those terms. My attorney has advised me of my rights, of possible defenses, of the Sentencing Guideline provisions, and of the consequences of entering into this agreement. No promises or inducements have been made to me other than those contained in this agreement. No one has threatened or forced me in any way to enter into this agreement. Finally, I am satisfied with the representation of my attorney in this matter.

LÉO WINSTON SMITH Defendant

I am Leo Winston Smith's attorney. I have carefully discussed every part of this agreement with my client. Further, I have fully advised my client of his rights, of possible defenses, of the Sentencing Guidelines' provisions, and of the consequences of entering into this agreement. To my knowledge, my client's decision to enter into this agreement is an informed and voluntary one.

Counsel for Defendant Leo Winston Smith

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